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Comments
STANDARD OF CARE FOR MEDIC. PRACT MONEIRs-ABANDONmEr OF
LocAIT RuLE-Clarence Blair severely injured his hand in an in-
dustrial accident and was treated for approximately one week by Dr.
Kenneth Eblen, a general practitioner in Henderson, Kentucky. When
his hand subsequently became infected, Blair requested, and Dr.
Eblen arranged for, the services of other physicians. After controlling
the infection, orthopedic specialists in Evansville, Indiana, amputated
Blair's thumb, index finger, and a portion of his ring finger. A specialist
in Louisville then attempted to restore function in his hand. In an
action brought against Dr. Eblen for alleged malpractice in the treat-
ment of the hand injury, the trial court instructed the jury that the
defendant was obligated to use such reasonable and ordinary knowl-
edge, skill, and care as is exercised by physicians in similar com-
munities. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant. On ap-
peal the plaintiff asserted that the language of the applicable standard
should not be restricted to "similar communities" but should be ex-
pressed as "the state of Kentucky." Held: Reversed. The defendant
in a medical malpractice case is under a duty to use that degree of
care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner
in the same class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar
circumstances. Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970).
The decision to abandon the anachronistic locality rule makes
Blair v. Eblen a landmark case in Kentucky malpractice law. The
locality rule, an unfortunate relic of more provincial times, has become
increasingly detrimental to the functioning of those groups which it
was established to protect: the medical profession generally and
plantiffs in medical malpractice actions specifically. This comment
will relate the history of the rule, the rationale for its adoption and
subsequent abolition, and the proposed long-range alternative, the uni-
form nationwide standard of care.
The standard of care in medical malpractice cases has been
defined as follows:
This legal duty requires that the physician undertaking the care
of a patient possess and exercise that reasonable and ordinary
degree of learning, skill, and care commonly possessed and exer-
cised by reputable physicians practicing in the same locality, or
in similar localities, in the care of similar cases; it requires also
IENTucKY LAw JouRNAL[
that the physician, in caring for the patient, exercise his best judg-
ment at all times.'
This requirement, concerning the evaluation of the physician in terms
of the locality in which he practices, has been denominated the
locality rule.
The locality rule is a doctrine peculiar to American law. It has
never been suggested in an English case and Lord Nathan indicates
that the English courts would reject a contention that the requisite
standard may differ from one part of the country to another.n2
The original and most narrow construction of the doctrine, the
"same locality" rule, requires that a physician adhere only to the
standard of care of the specific community in which he practices.3
Although the same locality rule is viable in a number of states today,
4
it has two practical drawbacks: the possibility of a small group of
practitioners establishing an unsatisfactory local standard of care and
the difficulty in securing competent local witnesses, i.e., the plaintiff
is forced to seek witnesses from among the defendant's colleagues.5
The same locality rule was soon superseded by the "similar
locality" rule which states that the defendant practitioner
[W]as bound to possess that skill only which physicians and
surgeons of ordinary ability and skill, practicing in similar com-
munities, with opportunities for no larger experience, ordinarily
possess .... I
Early opinions and legal writings indicated that the similar locality
rule was devised to protect the country and small town practitioner,7
theorizing that it would be "manifestly unfair" to require a physician
in a small rural community to exercise the same degree of skill as is
required of one who practices in a large city." Courts recognized the
expediency of the principle, reasoning that, in comparison with the
practitioner in a metropolitan area, the country practitioner did not
enjoy the same opportunities of daily observation and practice; 9 he
did not usually make a specialty of surgery and was limited in his
1 L. BEGAN, DocrroR AND PATINT AND THE LAw 17 (3d ed. 1956).
2 NATrAN, MEDxcAL NEGLIGENCE 21 (1957).
3 See, e.g., Force v. Gregory, 27 A. 1116 (Conn. 1893).
4 For a list of states which adhere to the same locality rule, see 18 DE PAuL L.
REv. 328, 332 n.13 (1968).
5 Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (Wash. 1967).
6 Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 132, 35 Am. R. 363, 365 (1880).
7This idea was recognized in Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970),
where the court stated: "In short, we will not perpetuate a rule designed to
protect country doctors in 1902.... ." Id. at 373.
8 21 R.C.L. Physicians & Surgeons § 30 (1918).
9 Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286, 290 (1872); Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46,
64 (1870).
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facilities.10 In addition, the country practitioner did not have the
same degree of skill, since the most talented naturally sought the
more lucrative fields of employment."
The first Kentucky case to define locality was Burk v. Foster.'
In a suit to recover damages for alleged careless and negligent treat-
ment of plaintiff's broken and dislocated arm by a small town physician,
the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant would be held
to the standard of care of the "ordinarily skillful and prudent physicians
and surgeons in that vicinity."' 3 The court of appeals rejected the
instructions, and hence the same locality rule, holding that the ap-
plicable standard of care would be "such as is exercised generally by
physicians of ordinary care and skill in similar communities," 14 citing
the similar community standard.15
For more than thirty years after the Burk decision, the Kentucky
courts reiterated the similar locality rule, substituting phrases such
as the following without noting any perceptible change in meaning:
"similar neighborhoods and surroundings;"'1 "where the defendant is
stationed and located;" 17 and "that vicinity."' 8
The court made its singular departure from the similar locality
rule prior to its decision in the Blair case in Tanner v. Sanders.19 In
an action involving alleged negligence by a Louisville dentist, the
court specifically affirmed lower court instructions which limited the
standard to "the community of Louisville."20 The court noted that
Louisville, being the largest city in the state, has "as high a standard
of professional skill as may be found in this country."21 After the
Tanner case the court returned to the similar locality standard, whether
such locale be a neighborhood, surrounding, or community.
22
The similar locality rule was not the perfect procedural solution
to the so-called "conspiracy of silence."23 The plaintiff was still re-
10 Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136, 35 Am. R. 363, 365 (1880).
1121 R.C.L., supra note 8.
12 69 S.W. 1096 (Ky. 1902).
13 Id. at 1097.
14 Id.
IG See note 6 supra.
1 Stevenson v. Yates, 208 S.W. 820, 822 (Ky. 1919).
17 Hoover v. McCormick, 247 S.W. 718, 722 (Ky. 1923).
18 Knopp v. Thornton, 250 S.W. 853, 854 (Ky. 1923).
'9 56 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1933).
20 Id. at 719.
21 Id. at 721.
2 2 See, e.g., Fields v. Rutledge, 284 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1955); Stacy v. Williams,
69 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1934); Van Sant's Admr v. Overstreet, 86 S.W.2d 1008 (Ky.
1935).2 3 See H. R. and M. B. Luwis, TnE MEDICAL OFFENDms, 301 (Ist ed. 1970)
for a detailed discussion of this problem. The following passage is representative
of the many obstacles facing the plaintiff's attorney in medical malpractice cases:
(Continued on next page)
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quired to produce the testimony of medical experts; however, the
rule did give him a wider area from which to draw. Some courts,
realizing the plaintiff's plight, succeeded in diluting the similar locality
rule in the following ways: by allowing expert witnesses from other
localities, provided such witnesses had knowledge of similar con-
ditions;24 by extending the geographical area involved to encompass
"medical locality", i.e., accessibility to medical facilities and exper-
ience;25by distinguishing between quasi-experimental ("teaching in-
stitutions") and conservative treatment;28 and by defining community
on the basis of various socio-economic factors. 2 7
Other states, not content with diminution and dilution of a rule
they felt to be inadequate and inferior, abandoned the locality rule
altogether. In 1916 the Suprerne Court of Minnesota, in Viita v.
Dolan,28 affirmed a lower court instruction that the locality of the
defendant physician was "among the circumstances to be considered 29
in evaluating the physician's conduct. Although the Viita case has
been called a "premature holding' 30 and was subsequently modified,3 '
the court's rationale was adopted in two very recent decisions, Pederson
v. DumoucheJ32 and Brune v. Belinkoff.33 The Brune case provides
a nationwide standard,34 both for the general practitioner ("the degree
of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking into
account the advances in the profession") 35 and for the specialist ("the
standard of care and skill of the average member of the profession
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Medical ethics generally prohibit physicians from airing a colleague's wrong-
doing beforhee lail. In 'embarrassing situations,' a set of A.M.A. principles has
stated, 'a physician should seek a personal interview with h fellow.' The codeadds that physicians should refrain from making a colleague's errors a matter ofpublic knowledge. Questions of conduct should be nsidered first before proper
medical tribunals in executive session. Id. at 302.
24 See, e.g., Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).
25 See, e.g., Flock v. J. C. Palumbo Fruit Co., 118 P.2d 707 (Idaho 1941);
Tvedt v. Haugen, 294 N.W. 183 (N.D. 1940).26McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, in PnorssIoNAtL
NErLI ENCE 13, 37 (T. Roady & W. Anderson ed. 1960).
27 See, e.g., Morrill v. Komasinski, 41 N.W.2d 620 (Wis. 1950); Michael v.
Roberts, 23 A.2d 361 (N.H. 1941).
28 155 N.W. 1077 (Minn. 1916).
29 Id. at 1081.
30 14 S.D. L. Rxv. 349, 351 (1969).
31 For a list of relevant decisions, see 18 DE PAuL L. REv. 328, 331 n.10
(1968).
324 31 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1967).
33 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968).
34 Noethat the court which promulgated the "similar locality" rule in Small
v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. R. 363 (1880) here expressly overrules it
The import of the Brune case is evidenced by its inclIusion in Averbach, The Ten
Leadin Malpractice Cases of the Last Decade i TrIAL Am ToRT TnxiZns 5 (M.
Belli e. 1970), and in Gottlieb, The Locality Rule, in LEGAL M Ern ANNuAL
31 (C. Wecht ed. 1969).35 Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968) (dictum).
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practicing the specialty, taking into account the advances in the pro-
fession"). 36  The Pederson case is more restrictive. The standard
therein is "that degree of care and skill which is expected of the
average practitioner in the same class to which he belongs, acting in
the same or similar circumstances." 37
When the Kentucky Court of Appeals finally38 abandoned the
locality rule, it defined the new standard of care as follows:
... [T]he defendant was under a duty to use that degree of care
and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner
in the same class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar
circumstances.
Under the standard just expressed, the evidence may include
the elements of locality, availability of facilities, specialization or
general practice, proximity of specialists and special facilities as
well as other relevant considerations.3 9
The court in Blair declined to record explicitly the law or policy
reasons on which it based its decision. One might assume, however,
that a study of the court's citations would provide the necessary
rationale. Dean Prosser 40 and the Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia4'
only serve to buttress the court's conclusion as to a trend away from
the locality rule. The case of Pederson v. Dumouchel4 is more useful
in extracting the Blair court's reasoning. The Pederson opinion implies
that advances in transportation and communication, availability of
new techniques and discoveries, and increased opportunities for
medical experience, observation, and consultation today invalidate
the reasons which justified the rule one hundred years ago.43
36 Id.
3 7 Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (Wash. 1967).
38 The abandonment of the locality rule by Kentucky was suggested in 29
Ky. L.J. 223 (1941) in which the author advocated that locality should simply
be one of the circumstances to be considered regarding the standard of care. It
was foreshadowed in Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ky. 1963), where
the court, although adhering to the locality rule, emphasized that to a large degree
the standard is dependent upon the nature and circumstances of the particular case.39 Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970).
40 W. Pnosszn, LAw OF TORTS 167 (3d ed. 1964).
41 1 LAwyns' MEDicAL CYCLOPEDIA 124 (rev. ed. Frankel ed. 1966).
42 431 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1967). The dependence herein on the Pederson case
to provide the missing rationale is based on the Blair courts adoption of the Peder-
son standard, with the minor qualification that the term "reasonably competent"
be substituted for the Pederson word "average." Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370,
373 (Ky. 1970).
43 The following passage from D. LouisELL & H. Wrms, THE PAREN-
CHYMA OF Lw 182 (1960) part of which was quoted in the Pederson case, adds
support to the rationale implied above:
J.. just as new legal concepts have had to be developed-one might say
invented-to handle new problems such as those of radio and television
broadcasting, aeronautics, and now space travel, so have changes in the
relationships between medicine and society as a whole brought about
(Continued on next page)
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Three parameters of the Blair decision are particularly note-
worthy. First, the decision specifically rejects the community standard
in favor of a nationwide standard of care for general practitioners.44
Second, it allows malpractice claimants to seek medical experts in
any geographic area of the United States. Third, it invites the medical
profession to rectify the situation.45 The unique aspect of the de-
cision is this summons to the medical profession to propose and execute
its own standards.
The general malpractice problem has been extensively publicized
recently. The President's health message to Congress,46 Congressional
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
modifications of the older legal standards by which physicians' conduct is
judged. Courts have begun to reappraise th e reasonableness of the tradi-
tional rule by which a physician charged with malpractice is judged only
according to the medical standards of his own or a similar community in
the same general area. The public and the courts undoubtedly will
recognize that in reality medical standards are becoming-if indeed they
have not already become-national in scope. Certainly this is already
true as to many elements of medical practice, particularly some which
are likely to be involved in charges of malpractice.
Can anyone deny, for example, that it is just as much below standard
practice to kill a child with excessive ether during an adeno-tonsillectomy
in a small town as it is in a large city? Or that a general practitioner
who undertakes to pin a hip should be held to a reasonable standard
established by specialists in orthopedics if the latter are available? Or that
an allergist who injects a dose of the wrong extract should be responsible
for the consequences whether he practices in Florida or Oregon?
The comprehensive coverage of the Journal of the American Medical
Association, the availability of numerous other journals, the ubiquitous
"detail men" of the drug companies, closed circuit television presentations
of medical subjects, special radio networks for physicians, tape recorded
digests of medical literature, and hundreds of widely available post-graduate courses all serve to keep physicians informed and increasingly
to establish nationwide standards. Medicine realizes this, so it is in-
evitable that the law will do likewise. id. at 182-84 (emphasis added).
44e defendant in the much-heralded Brune decision was a specialist;
reference was made to the standard for the general practitioner only by wa o
dictum. The Pederson case, in which the defendant was a general practitioner,
was more cautious than the Bleir case, qualifying its standard in terms of accessible
medical and professional means.
45Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970) wherein the court stated:
The point is this: We are convinced that the standard should be estab-
lished by the medical profession itself and not by the lay courts. Id. at
373.
467 WszzxLy COM] rrTxrONS Or Pnesz.sm i. Docui~sns 244 (1971). The
passage of The President's Health Message to Congress rosiga ComprehensiveHealth Policy for the Seventies most pertinent to this commenollows:
I_ am therefore directing-as a first step in dealing with this danger-that
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare promptly appoint and
convene a Commission on Medical Malpractice to undertake an intensive
program of research and analysis in this area. The Commission member-ship should represent the health professions and health institutions, the
legal profession, the insurance industry, and the general public. Its report
-which should include specific recommendations for dealing with the
problem-should be submtted by arch 1, 1972 . d. at 22 (emphai s
added).
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committee studies,47 reports of medical malpractice conferences, 48
books,49 and magazine articles"0 have all related the problem with
increasing concern.
Such concern is most appropriate when one considers the role of
the courts to date. There has long been a nationwide standard for
specialists;5 1 in fact, a survey52 of the American Specialty Boards, the
American Medical Association, and the American Hospital Association
concluded that the practice of medicine by certified specialists is
similar throughout the country.5 3 The courts, however, have lagged
in recognizing the dimensions of the dilemma with reference to the
non-specialist. To date physicians have been held to a nationwide
standard in only three areas-radiation therapy54 and the treatment of
fractures55 and cataracts. 56
Even if the courts were inclined to do so, it would be an arduous
task, in the absence of specific criteria, to devise comprehensive stand-
ards for a group as diverse and dynamic as the medical profession.
Realizing this, commentators have proposed a new standard:
It is anomalous enough that in this area [medical malpractice],
unlike most, the custom and practice of an occupational group
conclusively determines the applicable standard of care. It is more
than merely anomalous that so progressive a profession, with its
unmatched educational facilities, should not be held, in the law's
eyes, to a uniform medical standard of care.57
47 STAFF OF SENATE SuBCOc rrE ON EXECUTIVE IEORGCAIZA.TION, 91sT
CONG., 24 SEss., MEDICAL MALxRAcnicm: THE PATiENT vERsus THE PHYsiCrAN
(Comm. Print 1969).4
sAEMcAN OsrEoPArmc AssocIAoTIN, REPORT; FiRST NATiONAL CoNr-
ENcE ON MEDICAL MALPr CE, February 7-8, 1970, Chicago, Illinois (1970).
49 H. Ivws & M. LEWI, THE MEDICAL OFENERs (1970).5 0 Suing the Doctor: A Rising Problem, U.S. Nzws & Womm REPORT, March
8, 1971, at 70.
51 The cases are collected in Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 953 (1968).
52 14 STAN. L. REv. 884 (1962).
53 The conclusion was based on the existence of standardized requirements for
certification, subscriptions to medical specialty joumals, medical specialty societies,
and statements from American Specialty Boards. The conclusion did not pertain
to the practice of internal medicine, preventive medicine, psychiatry, neurology,
or surgery, but was applicable to the other nineteen recognized specialties. Id. at
887-89.54 Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND.
L. Rzv. 729, 737-8 (1970).
55 Murphy v. Little, 145 S.E.2d 760 (Ga. 1965):
There are doubtless areas of medicine where knowledge of proper
treatment is limited geographically ... but the human race has suffered
from broken bones for as long as it has been in existence. Id. at 764.
56 Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.W.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967):
As a specialist, with the advantage of additional training and a higher de-
gree of skill, the defendant is charged with knowledge of the standard
procedure for cataract operations throughout the country. Id. at 169.5 7 Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Mal-
practice Litigation, 18 DE PAuL L. REv. 408, 419-20 (1969).
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At present, the uniform nationwide standard of care is only an
abstraction in the most progressive medical and legal minds. In an
attempt to arrest the growing public criticism,58 the medical pro-
fession has acted to improve both its practice of medicine and its
relationship with the legal profession. To improve the practice of
medicine, the profession has established numerous continuing educa-
tion programs; it has been suggested that such programs might be
more effective if attendance and a terminal examination were man-
datory.59 To improve its relationship with the legal profession, the
medical profession, through local medical societies, has joined with
bar associations to provide expert testimony for the injured patients.60
Other mitigating activities include benefit schedules similar to work-
men's compensation schedules; interim payment by insurers to injured
patients, without admission of liability; and the use of arbitration. 61
As noted above, the medical profession has taken concrete, al-
though preliminary, steps toward a solution. The ideal, however, is
still the uniform nationwide standard of care. Such standard should
be an integral part of the "uniform national code of malpractice
evidence and standards" requested by the First National Conference
on Medical Malpractice. 62 It is hoped that the President's Commission
on Medical Malpractice, 63 the single group with power delegated to
act affrinatively and immediately, will delineate the standard so
vital to renewed excellence in medical treatment.
Regardless of the solution ultimately reached, the Kentucky court's
progressive decision in Blair v. Eblen may be viewed as a timely in-
vitation to the medical profession to resolve the malpractice problem.
Katherine Randall Bowden
FEDERAL INJUNCrIVE RELIEF: WHAT REMAINS AFTER YOUNGER V. HAR-
ms?-Historically, the equitable remedy of injunction has been subjected
to extensive limitations. Few legal maxims are as often referred to as
"equity will not grant specific relief where there exists an adequate
remedy at law." In application of this principle the courts have not
U8 See notes 45-49 supra, and accompanying text.
59 AMMIUCAN OsTEoPATHmc AssOCrATiON, supra note 48, at 30.
60 For a discussion of the use of panels of experts by California, Arizona,
Nevada, New Jersey, Indiana, and Wisconsin, see R. LONG, THE PHYSICIAN Arm
THE LAw 79 (1968).61 AMEICrAN OSTEOPATHIC Associ moN, supra note 48 at 28.
62 Id. at 38.
63 See note 46 supra.
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